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ABSTRACT 
When failure analysis and prevention, guided by historical design knowledge, are coupled 
with product design at its conception, shorter design cycles are possible. By decreasing the design 
time of a product in this manner, design costs are reduced and the product will better suit the 
customer’s needs. Prior work indicates that similar failure modes occur with products (or 
components) with similar functionality. To capitalize on this finding, a knowledge base of historical 
failure information linked to functionality is assembled for use by designers. One possible use for 
this knowledge base is within the Elemental Function-Failure Design Method (EFDM). This design 
methodology and failure analysis tool begins at conceptual design and keeps the designer cognizant 
of failures that are likely to occur based on the product’s functionality. The EFDM offers potential 
improvement over current failure analysis methods, such as FMEA, FMECA, and Fault Tree 
Analysis, because it can be implemented hand in hand with other conceptual design steps and carried 
throughout a product’s design cycle. These other failure analysis methods can’ only truly be effective 
after a physical design has been completed. 
The EFDM however is only as good as the knowledge base that it draws from, and therefore 
it is of utmost importance to develop a knowledge base that will be suitable for use across a wide 
spectrum of products. One fundamental question that arises in using the EFDM is: At what level of 
detail should functional descriptions of components be encoded? This paper explores two approaches 
to populating a knowledge base with actual failure occurrence information from Bell 206 helicopters. 
Functional models expressed at various levels of detail are investigated to determine the necessary 
detail for an applicable knowledge base that can be used by designers in both new designs as well as 
redesigns. High level and more detailed fimctional descriptions are derived for each failed 
component based on NTSB accident reports. To best record this data, standardized functional and 
failure mode vocabularies are used. Two separate function-failure knowledge bases are then created 
aid compared. Resalts indicate that encoding failure d2tz using more &tailed functional models 
allows for a more robust knowledge base. Interestingly however, when applying the EFDM, high 
level descriptions continue to produce useful results when using the knowledge base generated from 
the detailed hctional models. 
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1. INTKODUCTXOX 
In most design cases it is necessary that the designer have a wide knowledge of the nature 
of their new design in order to develop creative and robust ways to embody the functionality of a new 
product. In other words, the designer must have a useful intellectual knowledge base &om which to 
draw concepts and evaluate them, or perform an exhaustive review of potential concepts from 
external sources. Knowledge base driven design methods lessen the need for a designer to have a 
broad and deep expertise by searching and reusing archived design knowledge. The Elemental 
Function-Failure Design Method (Stock et al., 2003) provides designers a methodology for 
performing failure analysis in conceptual design and also aids them by using a function-based concept 
generator approach (Strawbridge et al., 2002) to streamline the design process. The EFDM is a start- 
to-finish design method that utilizes knowledge bases that link product function to likely failure 
modes and product function to possible concepts in order to minimize the designer’s need for a large 
intellectual knowledge base. 
The EFDM is a structured derivation of the function-failure analysis method of Tumer and 
Stone (2003). This method archives historical failure knowledge by linking it to functional 
representations of the failed component in matrix form. To accomplish this, the hc t iona l  basis 
(Hirtz et al., 2002) and a failure mode taxonomy (Arunajadai et al., 2002) are used to ensure a 
retrievable method of archival. However, it is possible to archive this information at multiple levels 
of abstraction. This paper investigates the process of populating function-failure knowledge bases at 
two such levels of abstraction in hopes of arriving at a reusable and robust methodology that can be 
applied to a wide range of engineering designs. 
In order to provide background on failure prevention in product design, this paper begins 
with a review of the prevalent methods for performing failure analysis on new designs in Section 2, 
with special attention given to the function-failure method of Tumer and Stone (2003) and the EFDM 
(Stockpet al., 2003). Since the Cimction-failure method and the EFDM are rooted in functional 
modeling, an explanation of the various levels of functional modeling is also given in this section. 
Two‘methods for populating a knowledge base for use in the EFDM are given in Section 3 along with 
the presentation of two sample knowledge bases. These knowledge bases are compared and used in 
an EFDM design case in Section 4. The paper finishes with conclusions and future work in Section 5. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Current Failure Analysis Methods 
Several failure analysis methods currently exist and are used in industry, but by far the 
most widely used method is Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). FMEA is a widely used 
method because it can be applied to systems, processes and product designs (Stamatis, 1995). In this 
paper, our review emphasis is placed on failure analysis for product design. FMEA was originally 
developed by the U.S. Military @IL-P-l629A, 1980) and its methods have been refined by different 
industries since its inception (ALAG, 1993). Even with this process refinement and formalization, 
there still exists multiple shortcomings within the failure analysis of FMEA. These shortcomings 
include a lack of well-defined terms (Lee, 1999), problems with identifying key failures (Bednarz and 
Marriott, 1988) and subjective analyses based on the user’s experience (Bell et al., 1992). Another 
common complaint of the FMEA process is that it is tedious (Hunt et al., 1995) and that engineers 
consider it to be “laborious” mirth et al., 1996). 
When concerned with product design, it is important that failure analysis is performed early 
in the design process in order to reduce the necessary amolint of redesigns. McICimey (1991) 
underlines the importance of performing failure analysis in conceptual design, but goes on to report 
that FMEA is commonly performed too late in the design cycle and has very little effect on the 
overall product design. To improve on these “classical” FMEA methods numerous attempts have 
been made to apply failure analysis during conceptual design. The FLAME system (Hunt et al., 
1995; Price, 1996) applies a computer simulated analysis to electrical system functional 
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representations early in the design cycle. The FLA&E system is a well-documented success of 
conceptual failure analysis but is limited to electrical systems. 
In system design, the Advanced FMEA (AFMEA) method of Kmenta et al. (1999) can be 
used to perform failure analysis on a functional representation of a system design. Much like 
FLAME, AFMEA seeks to capitalize on fewer physical redesigns by addressing possible failures 
before concrete physical representations of the design have been developed. Successful attempts at 
conceptual product design failure analysis are however much harder to come by. The CFMA method 
of Hari and Weiss (1999) is one such a method, but has shortcomings in that it actually assumes some 
degree of product form, thus making it not truly “conceptual.” 
To achieve a failure analysis method that is suitable for actual conceptual design 
implementation, it appears that the most applicable methods are those that rely on knowledge bases to 
alert the designer of possible failure modes within their new design. Knowledge base failure analysis 
methods began with the early matrix techniques for FMEA logistical archiving (Collins et al., 1976; 
Barbour, 1977; Goddard and Dussault, 1984). The WIFA system (wirth et al., 1996) populates 
knowledge bases with information from past failure analyses. This information is archived using 
standardized languages in order to improve the comprehensibility and reusability of failure analyses. 
The WIFA (a German acronym for “knowledge-based FIvf:EA’’) system is similar to the function- 
failure analysis method of Tuner and Stone (2003), with the exceptions of application stage and the 
theory behind failure mode enumeration. In WIFA, the analysis is performed within the traditional 
FMEA timeframe, which has been previously noted as being “too late” in the design cycle to truly 
guide and improve the design. To combat this, Turner and Stone tailored their method for use in 
conceptual design. Also, in WIFA the failures are enumerated for system elements but in the 
function-failure method, this is not possible. Since it is applied in the conceptual stage, Tuner and 
Stone’s method cannot rely on system elements since their physical form is unknown and products 
only exist as functional representations. Therefore, the function-failure analysis methods base their 
failure mode en-meration methods strictly on the desired fmctimzlity cfthe prodwt behg designed. 
The efforts of Stock et al. (2003) define a methodology for introducing failure analysis in 
conceptual design by using the theory behind the function-failure analysis. Their method, the 
Elemental Function-Failure Design Method (EFDM), combines the use of a knowledge base-driven 
failure analysis tool with proven concept generation techniques to arrive at a start-to-finish design 
method with a concentration on failure avoidance. The EFDM employs the use of a knowledge base 
of failure information linked to functionality to guide designers away from failures that are likely to 
occur based on their concept’s desired functionality. 
2.2 The Elemental Function-Failure Design Method (EFDM) 
The EFDM is a methodology that allows designers to perform failure analysis in conceptual 
design (Stock et al., 2003). The method is advantageous to a designer because following its steps can 
possibly reduce the number of necessary redesigns, thus shortening the overall design cycle. The 
EFDM allows even novice designers to use information from historical failure occurrences and 
analyses to guide their new designs. The EFDM is suitable for use in new design or redesign and is 
well-suited for use with the concept generator methods of Strawbridge et al. (2002). A graphical 
representation of the EFDM format can be seen in Pigwe 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, the EFDM requires a knowledge base of historical failure 
occurrences linked to product function in order to generate the likely failure modes for new designs. 
This knowledge base is generated using the method shown in the work of Roberts et al. (2002). This 
process of population relies on a user to develop two matrices that will then be multiplied together to 
arrive a third matrix, which will be known as the function-failure knowledge base. This process 
begins by acquiring historical failure knowledge on an artifact. The type of failure is classified within 
the failure mode vocabulary of Arunajadai et al. (2002) and then it is related to the artifact within the 
component-failure (CF) matrix. Within CF, the rows represent artifacts and the columns represent 
failure modes. A numerical value of ‘1’ present in cell CFg indicates that thej-th failure mode 
occurred for the i-th artifact. Upon completing the CF matrix, functional models are developed for 
each failed artifact and are also entered into matrix form. The function-component (EF) matrix 
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contains i sub-functions as row entries and j artifacts (or components) as column entries. As before, a 
value of ‘ 1’ in EF, indicates that the j-th artifact exhibited the i-th sub-function within its functional 
representation. The function-failure (EF) matrix is generated by multiplying EF and CF together. 
This matrix relates historical failure occurrences to functionality and is used as the knowledge base in 
the EFDM approach. 
Determine black-box model, complete 
to accomplish desired product 
functionality while best address- 
% 
1 
I 
I , 
Select component solution or 
concept variant that best 
Figure 1. The EFDM Procedure. 
When developing a knowledge base that can be applied across a wide range of design 
domains and applied to many different designs, it is important to use standardized vocabularies to 
archive information within the knowledge base. Utilizing standardized vocabularies limits ambiguity 
between different users and also maintains a serviceable size for the knowledge base. In other words, 
standardized vocabularies ensure that multiple entries of the same failure mode or function are not 
present under many aliases. The standardized vocabularies for failure modes and functionality used 
withizl the EFDM also benefit the user by supplying exhaustive definitions for the terns within them 
(Arunajadai et al., 2002; Hirtz et al., 2002). 
The concept generator (Strawbridge et al., 2002) is an approach that embodies a fmctiona! 
model with concepts that it draws from a howledge base known as a X, or function-component 
matrix. The X matrix is developed by investigating many products and relating the components 
within them to the functions that they perform. This is accomplished by generating functional models 
for the given artifact and then “reverse engineering” it to determine which of its components embody 
each function within the functional model. This method also takes advantage of the functional basis 
(H[lrtz et al., 2002) by using its vocabulary to archive within, and query fi-om, the X matrix. 
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The function-failure knowledge base and the concept generator are used in conjunction 
within the EFDM. The EFDM first generates a list of likely failure modes based on a very high-level 
functional description of a new design be querying the function-failure knowledge base. (Steps 1 and 
2 in Figure 1.) A more detailed functional model is then developed (Step 3) and the concept 
generator uses this functional model to enumerate possible concept variants (Step 4a). These 
concepts are then evaluated based on the list of possible failure modes (Step 5a) to arrive at a design 
that best addresses the historical likelihood of failure occurrence within the new product. 
2.3 Functional Modeling 
Functional models are graphical representations of product (or component) functionality 
(Otto and Wood, 2001). Functional models can be developed for existing products, but offer great 
benefits when they are linked with the design process to represent desired product functionality in 
order to satisfy customer needs. Functional models have been shown to provide a basis for 
organizing the design process, enhance creativity in design and allow designers to generate more 
solutions. Overall, functional modeling is a useful tool in developing successful products from the 
conceptual design stage. 
Functional models can exist at many different levels of abstraction (Gietka et al., 2002). 
Since the EFDM requires the use of functional modeling at multiple levels of abstractioc, a rigorous 
definition of these levels is given here. Venna and Wood (2003) propose three levels of functional 
modeling based upon the level of product detail contained within the model itself. These levels are 
enumerated as the black box, the design and the reverse engineering level of functional modeling. As 
expected, the black box level defines and represents only the most basic functionality and flows 
contained within the product or design. The design and reverse engineering levels are similar and are 
therefore the hardest to discern between. A design level functional model reprssents a= idially 
detailed representation of the sub-functions that act on the multiple flows that pass through the 
product being analyzed. This level leaves some amount of abstraction within the model and is most 
useful in conceptual design, thus garnering its name. The reverse engineering level is the most 
detailed model of the system and gets its name because these models are usually constructed after 
“tearing down” a product and analyzing each of its components. This can be seen for the electronic 
scale in Figure 2. 
Figure 2(a) shows the biack box level functional model of the scale. In this functioxal 
model, only the overall product function of ‘indicate weight’ and incoming and outgoing flows are 
shown. Figure 2(b) shows a design level functional model for the input flovys of weight and object 
and the output flow of visual signal. The design level functional model exhibits some amount of form 
independence and represents an intermediate level of modeling between the vague black box level 
and the most detailed reverse engineering level. Finally, Figure 2(c) shows the reverse engineering 
level hct ional  model for the same flows as in Figure 2(b). At this level, the functionality of the 
actual components guides the derivation of the functional model. It can be seen that the reverse 
engineering functional model takes the sub-functions of the design functional model to a more 
detailed level to express the functionality of the actual components within the design model. 
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Design level functional modelo_, T E, 
Ibj 
\ I  
object Position Export Solid Solid 
Sense 
Trans. E. 
Vis. Sig. Convert 
to An. 
An. Sig. 
A 
blec. E. Reverse Engineering level functional model (c) 
Figure 2. Different Levels of Functional Modeling for an Electronic Scale 
Each of these levels of functional modeling is important within the design process, 
especially when taking advantage of design information reuse and design by analogy methods. The 
EFDM takes advantage of two forms of design information reuse by reusing past concepts from the 
concept generator and past failures from the function-failure knowledge base to guide its design 
process. Therefore, since multiple levels of functional modeling are used within the EFDM, it is 
imperative to have a good understanding of the difference between them. The concept generator 
relies c:: a kaewledge base ef historicd prodwt desigm to develop new concepts. This knowledge 
base, known as the X matrix, is developed by constructing reverse engineering level functional 
mdels  for multiple products, linking the sub-functions from the model to components within the 
product and storing this information in matrix form. When used to generate concept variants, the 
concept generator can accept either design or reverse engineering level models for a new design. 
On the other hand, the EFDM strives to use a new product's functionality from its black 
box level functional models to develop an initial list of likely failure modes that the product will 
exhibit. However, the fundamental question arises whether the historical knowledge used to populate 
the hnction-failure knowledge base should be encoded at the black box or the reverse engineering 
level. We show that the concept generator allows for knowledge to be encoded at one level of 
functional modeling and queried at a less detailed level. Is this possible in the EFDM? This gives 
rise to the one fundamental concern of populating the function failure knowledge base: Since it is 
desired to use the EFDM at the black box level for new designs, should actual component failures be 
linked to the components' black box level function or should they be linked to more detailed 
cimponent functionality? 
3. METHODS FOR POPULATING FUNCTION-FAILURE KNOWLEDGE BASES 
3.1 Initial Efforts 
Roberts et al. (2002) constructed the first function-failure knowledge base by collecting 
failure information on Bell 206 rotorcraft using National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) accident 
reports. Components failures were determined from these reports and functional models were 
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developed for each of the failed components. The functional models of these components varied 
between containing a single sub-function, to containing up to five sub-functions to describe the 
component. In this initial test of the function-failure analysis of Tumer and Stone (2003) the level of 
functional modeling did not strictly adhere to any of the aforementioned levels as described by Verma 
and Wood (2003). The level of functional modeling used by Roberts et al. can best be described as 
fitting between the black box and design levels. 
Previous work by the authors (Stock et al., 2003) used more detail in developing a function- 
failure knowledge base using the same failure occurrence information as Roberts et al. (2002). In this 
more recent effort, the authors developed a function-failure knowledge base after developing reverse 
engineering level functional models of the failed components within the Bell 206 helicopter. When 
used within the structure of the EFDM, this detailed knowledge base showed improved faihie 
analysis over FMXA. 
3.2 Two Function-Failure Knowledge Bases at Distinct Levels of Detail 
To determine which level of functional modeling is best suited for developing a function- 
failure knowledge base, an experiment is undertaken in which two knowledge bases are consimcted, 
compared and used to perform failure analysis during the conceptual design of a new product within 
the EFDM framework. The first knowledge base to be constructed will utilize component functional 
models at the black box level, showing similarity to the method of Roberts et al.' (2002). This 
function-failure knowledge base will be referred to as EFI. The second knowledge base (EF,) will 
consist of the function-failure information harvested by Stock et al. (2003). The component 
functional models in EF, were developed at the reverse engineering level using the repeatable 
functional modeling methods of Kurhan et al. (2003). 
Component 1 Black Box Funciionai Modei 1 Reverse Engineering Leiel Functional Model 
I 1 I 
Figure 3. Functional Models Used to Populate EC1 and EC2. 
To develop these two knowledge bases, three matrices are generated. A single component- 
failure matrix is generated and named CFrotoreraft- This matrix contains information on 25 failed 
coaponeEts t b t  spm seven systems within the Bell 206 rotorcraft. These systems include the 
compressor, engine, powertrain, turbine, airframe and the fuel and rotor systems. (Multiple systems 
were chosen since studying systems across the entire rotorcraft makes for a knowledge base that can 
The actual Roberts et al. function failure knowledge base is not being used in this comparison because of its 
inconsistency in number of sub-functions per component functional model. Modeling in this fashion is 
ambiguous because it is difticult to determine the necessary number of sub-functions to adequately model the 
component. 
1 
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be appiied to more diverse design problems.) The 25 failed coriponents exhibited 15 unique failure 
modes within the failure mode vocabulary of Arunajadai et al. (2002). These failure modes were 
determined by studying the NTSB reports and relating the information contained therein to the 
primary and secondary identifiers for the failure modes within the vocabulary (Tumer et al., 2003). 
Two unique EC matrices are populated, EC1 and EC2. EG1 is populated by relating artifacts to their 
black box functional representation while EC2 is populated by relating the same artifacts to their 
reverse engineering level representations. The functional models in the second column of Figure 3 
represent a sample of those used to populate EC1 at the black box level. Similarly the models in the 
third column of Figure 3 show a sample of component functional models at the reverse engineering 
level that are used to populate EC2. In doing so, ECI contains only 11 unique sub-functions, while 
EC2 contains 55 unique sub-functions. Tnis is due increased detail of tJie reverse engineering level 
functional models used to populate ECz, these functional models contain between five and eighteen 
sub-functions depending on the functional complexity of the component under review. For example, 
the' O-ring component contains only five sub-functions while the more complex fuel governor and tail 
rotor blade components necessitate 18 sub-functions to completely model their functionality. In 
contrast, the black box functional models contain just one sub-function for each component. 
Tie function-failure knowledge bases are generztted tksough the fC;l!owiag cperztiocs: 
4. COMPARISON OF FUNCTION-FAILURE KNOWLEDGE BASES 
4.1 EF1 VS. EF2 
The EF1 function-failure knowledge base can be seen in Table 1 and EF2 can be seen in 
Table 2. Upon initial examination the most glaring difference between the two knowledge bases is 
the fact that EF2 contains far more sub-functions than EF1. This is directly reIated to the size of ECI 
and EC2, as explained above. 
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Function/Failure 
Guide PnE 
Guide RotE 
Regulate Liq 
Secure Solid 
Stabilize Solid 
Stop Gas 
Stop Liquid 
Transmit PnE 
Transmit RotE 
Table 2. EF2. 
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In common terms, equation (1) is populating the function-failure knowledge base with by 
linking each unique component failure occurrence to that component’s black box functionality within 
the knowledge base. For example, assume that the crank handle of the meat grinder in Figure 4(a) 
has two failure occurrences, one occurrence of brittle fracture and one occurrence of direct chemical 
attack. Since the black box functionality of the crank handle is ‘convert human energy to rotational 
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energy,’ a value of one would be added to the EP1 cells that relate ‘convert human energy to 
rotational energy’ to brittle fracture and to direct chemical attack. Conversely, populating the 
function-failure knowledge base at the reverse engineering level, as shown in equation (2), will relate 
component failure occurrences to every sub-function within the reverse engineering level functional 
model of the crank handle. In this case, the functional model of the crank handle contains 12 sub- 
functions as seen in Figure 4(c). Therefore, if the crank handle were entered into EF2, a value of one 
would be added to each of the cells relating these 12 sub-functions to brittle fracture and direct 
chemical attack. 
Figure 4. Functional Models of a Meat Grinder Crank Handle 
Another important point to note in the derivation of EFl and EF2 is that the component 
failure (CFrotorcrafJ matrix is binary in data representation. That is, it contains only ‘0’ and ‘1’ f G i  
numerical values. This is done to ensure that one component does not unfairly skew the knowledge 
base simply because more failure information was available for it. For egample, using the case 
above, if it were known that the meat grinder crank handle failed four times via brittle fracture and 
once via direct chemical attack, they would still both be entered into CF as the value ‘ 1.’ Thus at this 
point, the number of failure occurrences has not been entered into the function failure knowledge 
bases. Future work in this area involves using the number of occurrences for each failure mode to 
guide designers in accessing failure probability for their new design. A similar area for future work 
involves adding severity information to the archived failure knowledge in hopes of utilizing such 
information in failure probability and risk assessment. 
It can be seen that EF1 contains only eleven sub-functions to go along with the fifteen 
unique failure modes withio the knowledge base. Knowing that many functions will be needed 
within the knowledge base before it can be applied to diverse design problems, it is easy to see that 
many more failed components within the knowledge base will be needed before this style of 
population will result,in a knowledge base robust enough for use with the EFDM. In other words, 
EFl in its current state could only be used in design cases that contained the functions within its 
limited scope. 
By contrast, EF2 exhibits 55 unique sub-functions after populating it with information from 
the same 25 components as EF1. Using the same logic as before, if EF, was to be used in an EFDM 
design case, it would prove helpful for designs that could include five times the functionality as EFI. 
Therefore, populating a function-failure knowledge base at the reverse engineering level of functional 
modeling requires fewer failed components to arrive at a more useable knowledge base. In addition 
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te this, it is hypothesized that lixkhg failure modes to every sub-hction occurrence of a given 
function and flow pairing will yield a robust knowledge base for use in conceptual design. 
I I  I 
Figure 5. Comparison of Functions Within EF1 and EF,. 
Figure 5 shows the differences between the two existing knowledge bases, EFI and EF,. 
For seven of the 11 functions within EFI, the failure information contained therein was the same as 
that within EF,. Tne failure mode distribution for three of these functions can be seen in Figure 5(a)5 
(c) and (e). This behavior is the result of the given functionality appearing in the reverse engineering 
models for only the components for which it was in their black box model as well. On the other hand, 
the fellr sth-hctions thzt exhibited differeat failure mode distributions between the two knowledge 
bases, 'change gas', 'convert rotational energy to pneumatic energy', 'guide rotational energy' and 
'secure solid', can be found in many reverse engineering component models but not as fi-equentiy in 
the less detailed black box level models. The most glaring case of this situation occurs for the sub- 
function 'secure solid' as seen in Figure 5(0. 'Secure solid' is the black box sub-function for only six 
of the failed rotorcraft components but occurs in twenty-four of the reverse engineering level 
functional models. 
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By studying Figure 5, it can be seen that certain failure modes do indeed occur more 
frequently for some functions. None of the sub-functions within either EF1 or EF2 exhibit an even 
distribution of failure modes. This allows a designer to use the information in the knowledge bases to 
predict the failure modes that are most likely to occur for their new designs based on desired product 
functionality. This fact can streamline the design process by ensuring that some degree of failure 
avoidance is designed into the initial physical representation of new design or redesign. 
4.2 Using Each Knowledge Base in a New Design Case 
- -  
In this section, a design problem is proposed to test the utility of EFl and EF2 within the 
EFDM. To do so, a design problem is developed that meets with the functionality present within the 
two knowledge bases. In this comparison, a small hand-held air compressor will be designed. This 
compressor should be powered by a hand held electric drill and be capable of clearing debris from an 
area such as a workbench. A design for this device has previously been developed using the EF2 
knowledge base (Stock et al., 2003). This design, as well as the design methodology can be seen in 
Figure 6. In this product design case, using the EFDM with knowledge base EF2 led directly to the 
inciusion of shaft support bearings, increased heat transfering area, k p r w e d  chicking interface, m d  
a filter screen for the incoming air passage on the compressor. 
Rot.€. 
Convert 
Rot.€. to Pn.E. 
I/ Yielding 
Corrosion Fatigue 
Fretting Fatigue 
High-Cycle Fatigue 
Thermal Fatigue 
Convert R0t.E to Pn.E 
historically leads to 
these failure modes 
These failure 
modes used to 
develop detailed 
functional model 
5 g x e  5. Ccmpressor Design Uskg the EFDM and EF,. 
Following the same design process with EF1 is quite difficult and shows the problems 
inherent with using a knowledge base with few sub-functions. When generating the list of common 
failure modes from the black box function 'convert rotational energy to pneumatic energy,' there are 
less selection criteria for possible concept variants and it appears that this detracts from the thorough 
failure analysis usually seen in the EFDM. When using EF1 for this task, only three possible failure 
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modes are generated, less than half of the seven potential failure modes generated by using EF,. 
Noticeably absent in the list from EF1 is high cycle fatigue and any thermal effects. Further EFDM 
analysis shows that the possibilities of galling or seizing within the rotating componentry are also 
ignored when knowledge base EF1 is used. It is difficult to develop a completed design with EFI, but 
it easy to note that the failure analysis would be much less thorotlgh than if knowledge base EF, were 
used. Strictly adhering to the recommendations within the EFDM leads to an overall design similar to 
that seen in Figure 6 but does not include shaft support bearings, incoming air filter or thermal 
finning. Additionally, fatigue analysis would not likely be conducted, even though it was conducted 
when EF, was used in the design case. 
5. CONCLUSIONS/FUTURE WORK 
The knowledge-base driven failure analysis tool improves the design process by limiting 
redesigns and increasing the importance of failure analysis. Methods such as the EFDM can decrease 
the necessary time to conduct failure analyses (Stock et al., 2003) and by moving failure analysis to 
conceptual design can make it more powerful and influential in product design (McKinney, 1991). 
However, as in all design, the strength and breadth of the user’s knowiedge base is the key to the 
EFDM. A main advktage of the EFDM is that the user does not need to possess a vast intellectual 
knowledge base. The EFDM’s function-failure knowledge base dictates the effectiveness of the 
analysis that is performed. The EFDM is truly a case of being “only as good as your knowledge 
base.” Knowing this, substantial effort has been undertaken to determine the best manner of 
component functional model abstraction to arrive at the most robust and versatile knowledge base. 
This paper has presented two approaches for populating the EC matrix, using a black box 
level of functional modeling and using a more detailed reverse engineering level of modeling. 
Encoding knowledge into the EC matrix with reverse engineering level models yields a more robust 
function-failure howledge base for use w i t h  the EFDM. Not GTIY is enceding hfcxmation at this 
level an efficient method to populate a large knowledge base, it has been shown that such a 
knowledge base allows for a more thorough failure analysis during conceptual design. Therefore the 
EFDM can be used to the best of its capability in performing failure analysis in conceptual design, 
minimizing the need for costly and time-consuming redesigns. 
Future work in the area of function-failure howledge base population will focus on 
developing larger function-failure knowledge bases and applying them to disparate design cases to 
evaluate the utility of the EFDM. Archiving the number of failure occurrences and failure severity 
will increase the ability for designers to assign failure probability to their new designs based purely 
on product functionality. It is also desired to populate similar knowledge bases with past FMEA 
information in order to supplement the knowledge bases that contain actual failure occurrence 
information. 
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